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THE PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE TUG-OF-
WAR: THE PRESIDENT VERSUS
CONGRESS OVER THE BAN ON
HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY
The election of William Jefferson Clinton as the forty-second
President of the United States placed the issue of homosexuals in
the military at the forefront of the national consciousness. The ban
on homosexuals in the military has been in effect for decades,1 but
President Clinton vowed to lift the ban during his campaign, a move
which irked military leaders2 and many civilians. Clinton's position
on open homosexuality in the military left Congress up in arms as
well. The Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, a
Democrat, expressed grave concern about the prospect of lifting or
modifying the ban.3 Advocates of lifting the ban had hoped that
delaying the final implementation of the new rule would allay the
fears of their opponents,4 but the opposition proved tenacious.5 In
1. See infra notes 130-48 and accompanying text for a summary of the history of
the ban on homosexuals in the United States military.
2. See, e.g., John Lancaster, Why the Military Supports the Ban on Gays, WASH.
POST, Jan. 28, 1993, at A8 (canvassing military opinions on lifting the ban).
3. "We are not talking about civilian life... [w]e are talking about military life,
and there are fundamental differences that our military people know well but too
many times those of us in civilian life do not keep in mind." Lancaster, supra note 2,
at A8 (quoting Sen. Sam Nunn).
4. See generally Out of the Locker: Homosexuals and the Military, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 21, 1992, at A26 (identifying common concerns about homosexual behavior).
5. Congressional hearings during the spring of 1993 became quite heated, at one
point escalating into a debate over human sexuality when Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-
S.C.), an outspoken advocate of preserving the ban, exclaimed that "[h]eterosexuals
Washington University Open Scholarship
176 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 45:175
July 1993, President Clinton compromised by partially lifting the
ban, despite his campaign promise to lift it completely.6
Aside from the social and political concerns, Clinton's efforts to
lift the ban raise questions regarding the scope of presidential au-
thority in this matter. Some scholars and observers believe that the
President could lift the ban on his ownZ Others believe only Con-
gress has such authority.8 The President's compromise, 9 which
pleased neither group, is facing judicial challenges from both sides,
spurred on by the congressional ratification of the policy.10 Despite
don't practice sodomy." The statement drew derisive laughter from the Senate gal-
lery. Hearing Turns Into Debate on Sodomy, S.F. CHRON., May 8, 1993, at A3.
6. See infra note 9 for a brief description of the compromise plan.
7. "To reverse the ban on homosexuals requires one stroke of a pen; it can be
done by executive order." Out of the Locker, supra note 4, at A27. See also infra
notes 222-30 and accompanying text for an argument that an executive order alone
is sufficient to lift the ban.
8. "[Secretary Aspin] left open the possibility that the lifting of the ban could be
overturned by Congress if a consensus were not reached [during hearings]." Clinton
to Lift Gay Ban, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATcH, Jan. 28, 1993, at 1A.
9. Clinton's new policy is commonly called "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pur-
sue." Under the "Don't Ask" prong of the policy, armed forces recruiters can no
longer ask potential inductees about their sexual orientation. The "Don't Tell"
prong forces homosexual military personnel to keep their status secret - to "stay in
the closet" - lest they face discharge, or "separation," from service. The "Don't
Pursue" provision purportedly ends the so-called "witchhunts" designed to ferret
out homosexuals for separation, and requires equal enforcement of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) against both heterosexuals and homosexuals. Jon
Sawyer, Clinton Compromises on Gays in Military, ST. Louis PosT-DisPATcH, July
20, 1993, at 1A.
Some question whether the military enforces its law prohibiting sodomy, Uniform
Code of Military Justice, art. 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1988), equally against heterosexu-
als and homosexuals. Commentators claim the military only enforces Article 125
against homosexuals, even though the statute makes no distinction based on sexual
orientation. See, e.g., RANDY SILTS, CoNDucr UNBECOMING: GAYS & LESBIANS
IN THE U.S. MILrrARY 243-44 (1993). For further discussion of Article 125 and other
laws proscribing sodomy, see infra notes 130-34 & 149-69 and accompanying text.
10. On Sept. 28, 1993, the House of Representatives followed the Senate in codi-
fying the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue" policy. H.R. 2401, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993). The Clinton administration compromise policy passed in the House by
a 301-134 vote as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994, after the House rejected two other proposed amendments that
were, respectively, more lenient and more harsh than the compromise. For the texts
of each of the three proposed amendments and the debates over them, see 139
CONG. REC. H7065-89 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993).
Since President Clinton took office, observers had predicted that Congress would
take some action with regard to the ban. See, e.g., Clinton's Plan For Gays in Mill-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/6
HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY
Clinton's recent attempt at a compromise, this issue is far from set-
tled because the idea of homosexuals in the military incites great
emotion and apprehension, both in and out of the armed services."
This Note examines the sources and scope of executive power and
the exclusion of homosexuals from military service, applying the for-
mer to the latter to show that an executive order completely lifting
the ban would sustain legal and congressional attacks. Part I
presents a brief historical overview of presidential power, including
the President's power as commander in chief. Part II deals with a
specific aspect of presidential authority, the executive order. Part
III scrutinizes the military's ban on homosexuals from a constitu-
tional perspective. Part IV asserts that the President possesses the
constitutional authority to completely lift the ban. Finally, Part V
concludes that the President should issue an order to lift the ban
entirely.
I. PRESIDENTIAL POWER
The President wields supreme power over the armed forces as
commander in chief.12 The Constitution, however, does not articu-
late the extent of this power. Moreover, there is a surprising paucity
of judicial interpretation of the role of commander in chief.' 3 Many
of the cases that address the subject were decided a century ago,' 4
tary Pleases No One, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 18, 1993, at 4A; Nervous Ser-
vice, NATION, Dec. 7, 1992, at 688 (suggesting the potential for congressional
attempts to write the ban into law).
11. See, e.g., Molly Moore, Marines in Somalia Up in Arms Over Plan to Lift
Ban on Gays, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1993, at A10 (describing Marine response to the
proposal). See also Lancaster, supra note 2, at A8.
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. For a thorough analysis of the President's role
as commander in chief, see DOROTHY SCHAFFTER & DOROTHY M. MATHEWS, THE
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY AND NAVY OF
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 443, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
13. Very few cases actually address the precise issue of the President's power in
this regard. See infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text. Congress recognized this
difficulty when it revised Title 10 of the United States Code ("Armed Forces") in
1956 to read, "The President may prescribe regulations to carry out his functions,
powers and duties under this title." 10 U.S.C. § 121 (1983). The Explanatory Note
to § 121 reveals that Congress intended to clarify the vague understanding of execu-
tive power. The Explanatory Note states: "The revised section is inserted to make
express the President's general authority to issue regulations, which has been ex-
pressly reflected in many laws and left to inference in the remainder." Id.
14. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 115 (1895) (holding that the Presi-
dent is commander in chief of the armed forces "at all times," including peacetime);
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and today's courts rarely refer to them. Instead, modem judges and
scholars frequently turn to the words of Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison as a starting point for interpreting the scope of exec-
utive power.' 5
A. Eighteenth Century Framework
As a leader of the Federalists, Hamilton espoused the idea of a
strong central government headed by a unitary executive. 6 Though
he had several opponents, Hamilton insisted that such a government
would eradicate the defects and dangers of the Articles of Confeder-
ation,17 including the inability of the national government to raise
revenue 18 or to call up a militia. 9 The framers of the Constitution
Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 503 (1885) (placing Army regulations within the am-
bit of the President's authority as commander in chief).
15. See, e.g., Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Pow-
ers: A Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 668, 668 n.2 (1990)
(citing THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison)); Gregory M. Huckabee, The War
Powers Resolution: Law or Political Rhetoric?, 34 A.F. L. REv. 207, 207 n.1 (1991)
(citing THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton)); Paul R. Verkuil, A Propo-
sal to Resolve Interbranch Disputes on the Practice Field, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 839,
841 n.9 (1991) (citing Tim FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)). Justice Jackson
cited both Hamilton and Madison in what has become the preeminent statement on
presidential power. See Youngstown Sheet & ibe Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
n.1 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing discussions of executive power in 7
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76-117 (1851) and 1 JAMES MADISON, LETTERS
AND OTHER WRITINGS 611-54 (1865)). See also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 682 nn.26-
27 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison) and
No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)).
16. Despite his nearly royalist proclivities, Hamilton advocated a strong execu-
tive in the context of nationalizing, and thus strengthening, some of those powers
that proved least effective under the Articles of Confederation. Among those pow-
ers were several that the Constitution assigned to the President, including the power
to make treaties and to conduct foreign affairs. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 191-99
(Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
For a thorough discussion of Hamilton's concept of the "energetic executive," see
DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THm POLITICAL THEORY OF The Federalist 171-76 (1984).
17. See THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton) (urging against potential
tensions in the nation under the Articles of Confederation); THE FEDERALIST No.
23, at 148 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) (describing
the confederation as "[d]efective"); THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 232-33 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) (enumerating the problems of the
"feeble" confederation in collecting taxes).
Notwithstanding his reputation as a Jeffersonian in opposing a strong central gov-
ernment, James Madison also addressed the defects of the Articles at length. See
generally THE FEDERALIST No. 38 (James Madison).
18. Tim FEDERALIST No. 30, supra note 17, at 232-33.
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intended Congress to play a significant role in military affairs,2° but
they reserved the special role of commander in chief for the
President.2
In The Federalist, Hamilton elucidated his approach to the powers
of the President as commander in chief. The Chief Executive, ex-
plained Hamilton, would only command the militia when Congress
called it into actual service.22 He23 would serve as supreme com-
mander of the armed forces,' but would hold no power to declare
19. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 24, 29 (Alexander Hamilton) (dis-
cussing the military weakness of the national government under the Articles of
Confederation).
20. The Constitution provides in relevant part:
The Congress shall have Power To... provide for the common Defence... of
the United States... ; To declare War ... ; To raise and support Armies ... ; To
provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regula-
tion of the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia ... ; To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the fore-
going Powers ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Cf. ART. OF CONFED. art. VI (1781) (permitting individual
states to maintain their own militia and activate them in event of actual invasion,
even without congressional consent); id. art. VII (directing states to appoint certain
military officers); id. art. IX (granting to congress "the sole and exclusive right and
power of determining on peace and war, except [when a state is invaded, as provided
in art. VII"). The Articles of Confederation did not provide for a navy, an omission
that Hamilton attacked as a significant failure that the Constitution rectified. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 24 (Alexander Hamilton).
21. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. For a defense of the President's power as com-
mander in chief by way of comparison with analogous powers of the King of Great
Britain and the Governor of New York, see THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 444-46 (Al-
exander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 21, at 445-46. Hamilton characterized
this power as less broad than that of either the British King or the Governor of New
York. Id. at 465.
23. This Note refers to the President in masculine pronoun form as a matter of
convenience and historical fact. No gender bias is intended.
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 21, at 446. According to Hamilton, this
power was "nominally the same with that of the King of Great-Britain, but in sub-
stance much inferior to it." Id. As to governors, "it may well be a question whether
[the constitutions] of New-Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not in
this instance confer larger powers upon their respective Governors, than could be
claimed by a President of the United States." Id.
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war or to raise armies, powers granted exclusively to Congress.'
His administrative duties would include supervising military affairs,
generally with the aid of a subordinate officer.26 The President
would have complete supervision over all elements of the actual op-
eration of the armed forces, particularly in times of war.' Hamilton
believed that an individual could handle and exercise military power
more effectively than a council,28 and noted that such activity neces-
sarily involved administrative elements which also properly be-
longed to the executive.2 9 Nevertheless, ambiguity exists as to
which administrative aspects of military power rightfully belong to
the panoply of executive prerogatives and, in turn, to what degree.
B. Nineteenth Century Judicial Interpretation
United States v. Eliason provided the earliest judicial statement
concerning the President's role as commander in chief."0 In Eliason,
the government had brought an action of assumpsit against the ad-
ministratrix of the estate of an Army captain, alleging that the cap-
tain had not reimbursed the government for monies he had
improperly received."1 The defendant claimed a right to set-off
based on money the captain earned over and above his salary pursu-
25. Hamilton stressed that while the King retained full authority to declare war
and to raise and regulate armies, the Constitution divested the President of such
broad powers. Id. at 446, 450.
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 72 (Alexander Hamilton). Among those tasks that
"fall[ ] peculiarly within the province of the executive department" is "the arrange-
ment of the army and navy." Id. at 462 (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). The
President would delegate "immediate management" of his administrative duties to
"assistants or deputies." Id. at 463.
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 473 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961).
28. Id. Hamilton thought common sense dictated that the Executive should
have sole control, as an individual, over the military. "Even those [who] have in
other respects coupled the [President] with a Council, have for the most part con-
centrated [sic] the military activity in him alone." Id. See also GoTrFRIED DiETZs,
THE FEDERALIST- A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE GOVERNMENT 248 (1960)
(discussing Hamilton's view that the executive should control the military).
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 27, at 473. "The direction of war im-
plies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employ-
ing the common strength, forms an [sic] usual and essential part in the definition of
the executive authority." Id. (emphasis added).
30. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291 (1842).
31. Id. at 296.
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ant to an 1821 War Department regulation.32 The case hinged on
the validity of the 1821 regulation because of a subsequent War De-
partment regulation prohibiting all supplementary compensation for
military officers.33 The circuit court held that the later regulation
did not limit prior disbursements; rather, it restricted extra compen-
sation appropriated during the legislative session in which the stat-
ute and subsequent regulation was passed.34 Therefore, the court
concluded, Captain Eliason's estate was entitled to an allowance for
money earned under the earlier regulation.3 5
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the President has
broad authority to issue regulations concerning the armed forces.3 6
According to the Court, if the President can issue regulations, he
can also change them at his sole discretion.37 Thus, the second regu-
lation effectively trumped the first. The Eliason Court emphasized
that the President's decisions with respect to the military carry the
force and effect of law, whether he acts alone or delegates author-
ity.3" Eliason became a benchmark for the doctrine of plenary exec-
32. Id. at 293. The regulation, Army Regulations of 1821, art. 67, § 14, permitted
extra pay for additional duties performed by a commanding officer as part of the
construction of fortifications. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 293.
33. Id. The War Department issued this regulation in 1835, in compliance with a
law passed by Congress ten days earlier. See Act of Mar. 3, 1835, ch. 26, 4 Stat. 753,
754-55 (1835).
34. United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291,293-94 (1842), rev'g 25 F. Cas.
997 (C.C.D.C. 1841) (No. 15,040).
35. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 294; see also 25 F. Cas. at 998.
36. "The power of the executive to establish rules and regulations for the gov-
ernment of the army, is undoubted." 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 301. The Court found that
the defendant's reliance on the 1821 regulation was an implicit recognition of that
power. Id. at 301-02.
37. "The power to establish [rules] implies, necessarily, the power to modify or
repeal, or to create anew." kI at 302 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 302. The fact that the Secretary of War issued the regulation did not
render it ineffective, according to the Court, because "rules and orders publicly
promulged [sic] through [the Secretary] must be received as the acts of the execu-
tive, and as such, be binding upon all within the sphere of his legal and constitutional
authority." Id.
On the facts of this case, the holding meant that the 1835 regulation properly
superseded the 1821 regulation, so the estate could not claim the set-off. Id. The
Court's opinion did not differentiate between an executive department regulation
issued pursuant to express statutory authority and a regulation issued absent con-
gressional mandate. It addressed the situation as though the regulation originated
wholly from the executive. See supra note 33 (detailing congressional action on this
regulation). For a more detailed exploration of the effectiveness of presidential ac-
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utive authority over the military, although it was over forty years
before the Supreme Court acknowledged the precedential value of
Eliason, in Kurtz v. Moffitt.3 9
In Kurtz, the plaintiff brought a writ of habeas corpus against two
city police officers who arrested him for deserting the Army.
40
Kurtz alleged that the police officers lacked authority to arrest him
for violating military law because they were not representatives of
the United States government.4' The Supreme Court upheld
Kurtz's claim because the government relied on a presidential proc-
lamation no longer in effect.4" Although presidential military or-
ders and regulations certainly carried legal effect over members of
the armed forces, the Court indicated that the authority of those
regulations over civilians, particularly in peacetime, was suspect.43
tion taken with or without statutory authority, see Youngstown Sheet & TIbe Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also infra notes
91-107 and accompanying text.
Several courts have relied upon Eliason to support the proposition that executive
department directives promulgated by cabinet officials carry the same force of law
as acts of the President. See, e.g., In re Neagle, 39 F. 833, 860 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1889)
(Justice Department); United States v. Badeau, 31 F. 697, 699 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887)
(State Department); United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 648, 651 (C.C.D.C. 1854)(No.
15,493a) (Department of the Navy); United States v. Freeman, 25 F. Cas. 1211, 1213
(C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 15,163) (War Department), answering questions certified
from 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556 (1845); In re Sheazle, 21 F. Cas. 1214,1217 (C.C.D. Mass.
1845) (No. 12,734) (State Department).
39. 115 U.S. 487, 503 (1885). Kurtz was the first post-Eliason case to link the
concept of presidential authority over the military to presidential power to issue
binding military regulations as commander in chief. Kurtz, 115 U.S. at 503. It was
the first in a long line of cases upholding the President's power as commander in
chief to regulate military law. See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952);
Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543
(1887); McDonald v. Lee, 217 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1954), reh'g denied, 217 F.2d 625
(5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 349 U.S. 948 (1955); United States v. Curtis, 28
MJ. 1074 (N.M.C.M.R. 1989).
40. Kurtz, 115 U.S. at 487.
41. Id at 498.
42. Id. at 504. The proclamation on which the government relied, Exec. Order
No. 1, reprinted in 13 Stat. 775 (1863), sought the assistance of "patriotic and faithful
citizens" in returning absent soldiers to their regiments and "support[ing] the proper
authorities in the prosecution and punishment of [deserters]." 13 Stat. at 776. The
Kurtz Court found that President Lincoln issued the proclamation during wartime,
which he undoubtedly had authority to do as commander in chief. Congress, how-
ever, subsequently repealed the statute on which Lincoln's order was based, so the
order lost its legal effect. Kurtz, 115 U.S. at 504.
43. The Court grounded its decision on the invalidity of the executive order, but
expressly left open the question whether valid Army regulations could "confer au-
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C. The President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
Challenges to the scope of presidential authority have frequently
occurred in the context of troop movements or other affirmative
uses of force. The challenges often questioned the proper scope of
executive power vis-A-vis that of Congress.' One former Reagan
Administration official found that, as of 1970, Presidents had sent
troops abroad for military action 199 times, but only sixty-two of the
military actions had prior explicit congressional endorsement.'
Since 1970, that trend has continued unabated, including actions in
Iran, Grenada, Libya, Panama, Iraq and, most recently, Somalia.
4 6
These post-1970 military forays had at least arguable legislative sup-
port under the War Powers Resolution.47 The Resolution requires
the President to notify Congress if he intends to deploy troops to a
hostile area without seeking a declaration of war, regardless of
whether the danger of armed conflict is actual or imminent.4" An-
other relevant similarity among these military actions is their cus-
tomary classification as matters of "international relations" rather
thority upon civil officers or private citizens to enforce the military law." The Court
implied in dictum that Army regulations could not delegate such authority. Id. at
503.
44. This is not a recent phenomenon. One author traces the origins of the execu-
tive/legislative debate over war power to Thomas Jefferson, the old foe of executive
strength. As President, Jefferson sent the Navy to "the shores of Tripoli" to quell
the rise of the Barbary pirates in 1801, without seeking congressional approval.
Huckabee, supra note 15, at 207. Many members of the 29th Congress vehemently
opposed "Mr. Polk's War" with Mexico - though they did authorize President Polk
to "prosecute [the] war." Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, § 1, 9 Stat. 9 (1846). President
Lincoln faced much animosity, from Congress and elsewhere, for his suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 1, reprinted in 13 Stat. 730
(Sept. 24, 1862). For a brief but illustrative overview of presidential exercises of war
power, see Huckabee, supra note 15, at 207-15.
45. Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds, quoted in Charles
Bennett et al., The President's Powers as Commander in Chief Versus Congress' War
Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMi L. REv. 17, 24 (1988).
46. Reynolds cited the first three examples; the others have occurred since he
made his observations. See id
See also, e.g., Molly Moore & Ann Devroy, Officials Say Panama Taking More
Time and Troops Than Expected, WASH. Posr, Dec. 23, 1989, at A7 (discussing the
letter President Bush sent Congress pursuant to the War Powers Resolution); Tracy
Thompson, Two Federal Judges Reject Challenges to Bush's Actions, WASH. POST,
Dec. 14, 1990, at A45 (reporting a challenge by 52 members of Congress to the
President's action in Iraq without congressional approval).
47. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
48. Id. at § 4(a).
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than domestic military affairs. Calling these actions international
relations allows the President to defend his actions on the ground
that he unquestionably enjoys supreme authority over foreign af-
fairs, even if he must share some military responsibility with
Congress. 4
9
The President's authority to regulate, as opposed to activate, the
armed forces is considerably more difficult to assess. Congress has
attempted several times to clarify the situation through legislation,
but the statutory language is susceptible to several interpretations.
Many different statutes arguably control executive directives con-
cerning the military. First, title 10 of the United States Code gives
the President general power to issue regulations to fulfill his respon-
sibilities."0 Second, 5 U.S.C. § 301 permits the head of any execu-
tive or military department to regulate his or her subordinates and
the general operation of the department.5' The President, in turn,
49. The President's role in foreign affairs is as clear and dominant as his regula-
tory power over the military is vague and contradictory. The President "shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties... ; he
shall nominate, and [with Senate consent] appoint Ambassadors .... " U.S. CONsT.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, Sociadad Anonima v.
Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1964) (maintaining
that "the conduct of foreign affairs is a function of the Executive"); Neal-Cooper
Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769,773 (D.D.C. 1974) (asserting that "it is true
beyond peradventure that the conduct of our foreign relations is solely in the hands
of the President"). See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 319-27 (1936) (discussing the President's status as the ultimate deci-
sionmaker in the sphere of international relations).
Before he became Chief Justice, John Marshall alluded to this aspect of executive
power during debate in the House of Representatives, stating, "The President is the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations." 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 613 (1800); see also Charles J. Cooper et
al., What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. Rlv. 165, 197-
99 (discussing constitutional language and case law supporting the President's for-
eign policy supremacy).
50. 10 U.S.C. § 121 (1988). For further discussion on this codification of execu-
tive power, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
51. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). The original version of this statute did not mention
military departments per se, because those departments (Army, Navy and Air
Force) were styled "executive" until enactment of the National Security Act
Amendments of 1949, 63 Stat. 578 (1949). Once they officially became military de-
partments, Congress amended § 301 to reflect the section's continued application to
the armed forces. 5 U.S.C. § 301, Historical and Revision Notes (1988). The statu-
tory definition of "military departments" appears at 5 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
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has the final say in executive department affairs, including the regu-
lation of executive department employees.5 2
The question of presidential regulation of the military does not
end there, unfortunately. Several statutes and cases address
whether members of the armed services are "employees" within the
meaning of section 7301 and other statutes. For example, the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA) defines "employee of the govern-
ment" to include members of the armed forces and on-duty
National Guard members.53 The FTCA grants military personnel
the right to sue the government on certain tort claims, but excepts
suits for injuries sustained in combat.54 On the other hand, Presi-
dent Reagan's Drug-Free Federal Workplace Order expressly ex-
cludes members of the armed forces from the covered group of
employees.-5 Title 5 of the United States Code, which contains rules
for the operation of government and regulation of its employees,
includes members of the armed forces in the definition of govern-
ment employees. 56 Yet, some courts have held that uniformed
members of the military are not employees of military departments
in the context of employment discrimination.57 The case law deter-
52. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The military is but one of the executive depart-
ments over which the President has ultimate supervisory responsibility. See supra
notes 22-29 and accompanying text for further discussion of the President's role as
executive and military supervisor. See also 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1988), which states,
"The President may prescribe regulations for the conduct of employees in the execu-
tive branch." 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1988). President Reagan advanced this section as
support for his directive mandating drug testing for federal employees. Exec. Order
No. 12,674, 3 C.F.R. 215 (1989), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 7301 (Supp. 1992).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988).
54. Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1434 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1983); see also
28 U.S.C. § 2680() (1988) (exempting the government from liability for combat inju-
ries sustained in wartime).
55. Exec. Order No. 12,564, § 7(e), 3 C.F.R. 224, 229 (1986).
56. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2101(3), 2105(a)(1)(C) (1988). Title 5 includes members of the
armed forces in the definition of "uniformed services." The armed forces include
the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard. 5 U.S.C. § 2101(2). The
definition of uniformed services encompasses certain officers of the Public Health
Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in addition to
the armed forces. 5 U.S.C. § 2101(3).
57. The District Court for the Western District of Missouri interpreted the Dis-
trict Court of Arizona's decision in Vance v. Arizona Army National Guard, No. 74-
329, slip op. (D. Ariz. June 18, 1975), to mean that uniformed military personnel
cannot be employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Lear v.
Schlesinger, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 337, 341 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (quoting
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mining whether military personnel are employees of the federal gov-
ernment is widely split,58 making a conclusive, permanent answer to
the conflict between executive and legislative power to regulate the
military unlikely.
II. EXECUTrVE ORDERS
The President's power to unilaterally regulate members of the
armed forces depends largely on his ability to act unilaterally in any
situation. Historically, Presidents have avoided congressional inter-
vention by the use of proclamations and executive orders.
A. Constitutional Basis
The Constitution lacks any express provision authorizing the Pres-
ident to issue executive orders. Those who have examined the ques-
tion of a constitutional mandate for executive orders point to
several sources of authority, including the President's role as super-
visor of the executive department and its agencies,5 9 the duty to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"60 and even the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)). Therefore, the Lear
court reasoned, military personnel also are not federal employees under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1988).
58. For other cases addressing the nature of members of the armed forces as
employees of the federal government, see Frey v. California, 982 F.2d 399 (9th Cir.
1993) (concluding that state military departments - the National Guard - are not
employers as defined in the ADEA); Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) (permitting member of the uniformed military to recover in sex discrimination
suit against the government under Title VII); Davis v. United States Dep't of the
Army, 602 F. Supp. 355,356-59 (D. Md. 1985) (precluding recovery under the FTCA
when an army hospital disposed of remains of stillborn fetus born to a female mem-
ber of armed forces because the woman's subsequent emotional distress did not oc-
cur as an "incident to military service"). But see Vance v. Arizona Army Nat'l
Guard, No. 74-329, slip op. (D. Ariz. 1975) (holding that member of uniformed mili-
tary could not recover damages in a Title VII action against the government).
59. U.S. CONsT., art. II, § 2, cl. 1. See also HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS: A
STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 6-12 (Comm. Print 1957) [hereinafter
ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS] (tracing the history of presidential supervision of
executive officers and agencies).
60. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. See also SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON NATIONAL
EMERGENCIES AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS, EXECUTIVE ORDERS IN
TIMES OF WAR AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY, S. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1974) [hereinafter NATIONAL EMERGENCY] (examining the historical basis for
executive orders).
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general notion that "the entire executive power is vested in the Pres-
ident.",6 1 Even with the amorphous constitutional foundation of ex-
ecutive orders, presidents have issued them in one fashion or
another since 1789.62
B. Historical Analysis
Presidents have promulgated executive orders for literally
thousands of purposes. George Washington established the ideal of
a strong executive by issuing a "Neutrality Proclamation" in 1793.63
Washington's successor, John Adams, continued the strong execu-
tive tradition, particularly with respect to the constitutional mandate
to supervise the executive branch.' 4 Having voiced zealous opposi-
tion to broad executive power prior to reaching the White House,
61. Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498. A Test Case in Presiden-
tial Control of Executive Agencies, IV J.L. & PoL'Y 483, 487 (1988) (quoting AN-
DREW JACKSON, TmE AUTONOMY OF THE ExEcurIVE (1834), reprinted in 6 THE
ANNALS OF AMERICA 58, 60 (Mortimer J. Adler et al. eds., 1968)).
62. Although executive orders were not numbered until Abraham Lincoln's ad-
ministration, George Washington issued "proclamations," which were equivalent in
intent and effect to the later "executive orders." Cross, supra note 61, at 484 n.5.
Estimates of the number of executive orders and proclamations, including those
before Lincoln and many unnumbered thereafter, range from 15,000 to 50,000. NA-
TIONAL EMERGENCY, supra note 60, at 2.
63. Washington's proclamation declared American neutrality in the conflict then
occurring between France and Great Britain. As had been and would be character-
istic of Washington's presidency, his two closest advisors, Treasury Secretary Alex-
ander Hamilton and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, differed sharply regarding
the proper message to send concerning America's position in world affairs. In part
because of British ties, but also because he favored a strong executive, Hamilton
supported the proclamation. Jefferson, on the other hand, as a former minister to
France and a staunch foe of executive usurpation of power, believed the proclama-
tion both unwise and unconstitutional. See ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS, supra
note 59, at 15-16. It is particularly interesting that Washington would exercise such
expansive power in light of the struggle he helped lead to break away from the
British monarch, a very strong executive indeed.
64. Cross, supra note 61, at 485-86.
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the next two Presidents, Thomas Jefferson65 and James Madison,66
each managed to exert substantial influence over executive affairs.67
Later Presidents have taken advantage of this perceived constitu-
tional power to implement their policies, often without seeking con-
gressional approval. Andrew Jackson fought several celebrated
political battles with Congress,68 earning the nickname "King An-
drew I.,,69 Use of the executive order attained an early zenith of
power under Abraham Lincoln. During the Civil War, Lincoln
made expansive use of his executive power, most notably in sus-
pending the writ of habeas corpus and issuing the Emancipation
Proclamation.70
Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus led to two famous state-
ments by the Supreme Court on the breadth of unilateral executive
power. In the earlier of these, Ex parte Vallandigham ,71 a civilian
65. For an analysis of Jefferson's clashes with Hamilton over the Neutrality Proc-
lamation, see DuMAs MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 68-89
(1962).
66. Madison and Hamilton engaged in a spirited dialogue of articles published in
1793 under the pseudonyms "Helvidius" and "Pacificus," respectively, wherein the
two men espoused their opposing views of the Neutrality Proclamation. Madison,
like Jefferson, believed that the proclamation amounted to a declaration of no war,
which was properly a legislative function. Any executive use of legislative power,
according to Madison, was "[iln theory,... an absurdity, ... in practice a tyranny."
ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS, supra note 59, at 15-18 (citing CHARLES M.
THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793: A STUDY IN CABINET GOVERNMENT
555-56, 596, 598-99 (1931)).
67. Cross, supra note 61, at 486-87. Professor Cross cites Jefferson's purchase of
the Louisiana Territory and Madison's activities as de facto Secretary of State in his
own administration as examples of the two Presidents' changes of heart as Chief
Executive. Id.
68. Id. at 487-89. Among Jackson's battles were the fight to dissolve the Second
Bank of the United States and the struggle over nullification. Id. See generally
MARQUIS JAMES, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 487-716 (1938) (discussing Jack-
son's presidency).
69. JAMES, supra note 68, at 606. The sarcastic title of "King," as well as its
companion appellation, "[His] Celestial Majesty," were introduced and used by sup-
porters of Henry Clay early in the acrimonious election campaign of 1832. Id. at
604-06.
70. Cross, supra note 61, at 488-89. As early as the 1860s, few questioned the
right of the President to act in time of war or national crisis, even absent statutory
authority. See, e.g., Proclamation of Apr. 15, 1861 (calling out state militias to sup-
press rebellion) and Proclamation of Sept. 24, 1862 (suspending the writ of habeas
corpus), reprinted in NATIONAL EMERGENCY, supra note 60, at 185-86.
71. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863).
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citizen72 had spoken publicly against the actions of the United States
government in the Civil War.7 3 He was arrested and taken before a
military tribunal which charged, tried and ultimately convicted him
of opposition to the government in its efforts to suppress the rebel-
lion.74 Vallandigham sought a Supreme Court ruling that his arrest
denied him due process, and that he was unlawfully prosecuted and
convicted as a civilian under military procedure.75 Vallandigham's
chief objection, however, was that President Lincoln illegally com-
muted his sentence76 to exile in the Confederacy,77 based on the
unauthorized action of a military commission.78 The Court avoided
that delicate issue by dismissing Vallandigham's petition on proce-
dural grounds.79
The Court took up the substantive issue presented in Val-
landigham in 1866, in Ex parte Milligan.8  As in Vallandigham, Mil-
ligan, a civilian, petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus,
81
which President Lincoln had suspended during the war with con-
gressional permission.' Milligan, however, had filed his petition in
72. The petitioner, Clement L. Vallandigham, was a member of Congress notori-
ous for his anti-war rhetoric. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATrLE CRY OF FREE-
DOM: THE Cvq WAR ERA 591-99 (1988) (discussing Vallandigham).
73. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 244.
74. IL
75. Id. at 246.
76. Upon conviction, Vallandigham was sentenced to "confinement in some for-
tress of the United States .... there to be kept during the war." Vallandigham, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) at 247.
77. Id. at 248.
78. Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside created the commission in order to
prosecute "spies or traitors" who spoke out against the Union government while in
Burnside's area of command, the Ohio Department. Id at 243-44.
79. The Court considered the constitutional parameters of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction, U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, and concluded that the Court lacked
appellate jurisdiction over a military commission. Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at
249-52. The Court's original jurisdiction did not extend to issuing a writ of habeas
corpus to a military tribunal after the President suspended the writ, nor did its appel-
late jurisdiction permit it to grant a writ of certiorari to review the tribunal's pro-
ceedings. Id. at 253.
80. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
81. Id at 4. Milligan, like Vallandigham, was tried and convicted by a military
commission for participation in an anti-war and anti-Union organization. Id. at 6-7.
82. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755 (1863) (permitting the President,
"in his judgment," to suspend the writ of habeas corpus "whenever... the public
safety may require it").
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the circuit court after the war ended.83 The Court concluded that
the government had no justification to retain custody of Milligan.8 4
The Court's limited holding prohibited arrests such as Milligan ex-
perienced, when neither an invasion nor a hindrance to law enforce-
ment existed.85 Because neither the threat of invasion nor
insurrection existed in some other part of the country, there was no
support for the government's action against Milligan.86 The thrust
of the Milligan holding has continued to affect executive action to
the present day: in times of emergency or national crisis, the Presi-
dent may act unilaterally and, if necessary, drastically to protect the
government and American citizens. Courts will scrutinize the exec-
utive action carefully, and only a compelling governmental interest
in national security or the safety of American citizens will justify
restricting or suspending fundamental constitutional rights.8 7
C. Modern Use of Executive Power: The Youngstown Legacy
After Lincoln, Presidents used the executive order with increasing
frequency.88 Many times, Presidents used the executive order to as-
83. Milligan filed his petition in the Circuit Court for the District of Indiana on
May 10, 1865, a month and a day after Grant and Lee met at Appomattox Court
House. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 7.
84. Id. at 126-27.
85. Id. Milligan was arrested in Indiana, which was not invaded during the Civil
War. The Court held that martial law is appropriate only when there are actual
uprisings or disorder. Id.
86. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 126-27. The Court stated: "Martial law cannot
arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the inva-
sion real, such as effectively closes the courts and deposes the civil administration."
Id. at 127 (emphasis in original). For a thorough exposition of this doctrine and a
summary of Vallandigham and Milligan, see ORDERS AND PROCLAMATMONS, supra
note 59, at 25-27.
87. In Milligan, the Court explained:
The power to make the necessary laws is in the Congress; the power to execute
it is in the President. Both powers imply many subordinate and auxiliary pow-
ers. Each includes all authorities essential to its due exercise. But neither can
the President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper authority of
Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the President. Both are
servants of the people, whose will is expressed in the fundamental law.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 139.
88. It is difficult to determine the number of executive orders with any degree of
certainty, for there was no formal numbering system until 1907. Hugh C. Keenan,
Executive Orders: A Brief History of Their Use and the President's Power to Issue
Them 17-18 (1974), reprinted in NATIONAL EMERGENCY, supra note 60, at 38-39.
Even without exact numbers, certain trends exist in the number and frequency of
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executive orders over time. The following table lists the number of executive orders
issued by each President from 1863 to January 1993. The annual average permits
comparison among Presidents whose terms of office vary widely. Note especially














































































































* Approximate; partial years rounded to nearest half-year, average number of executive
orders rounded to nearest whole number.
** Less than one.
Data to February 13, 1974, excerpted and adapted from Keenan, supra, at 19-26,
reprinted in NATIONAL EMERGENCY, supra note 60, at 40-47; data since February 13,
1974, compiled from various editions of 3 C.F.R.
A cursory analysis of the tabulated information reveals that wars and economic
strife produce an increase in executive orders, indicating the President's broad au-
thority to act in such situations. Interestingly, there has been a mild downward
trend in executive orders since Truman, perhaps due in part to the restriction of
Truman's executive power in Youngstown Sheet & Thbe Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
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suage problems brought on by national emergency or war.89 Other
times, Presidents asserted authority under a theory of "inherent" ex-
ecutive power.90 The landmark example of such action occurred
when President Truman seized the American steel mills, which led
to the Supreme Court's decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.9
1
The Youngstown litigation arose out of a background of acerbic
labor disputes between management and employees in the steel in-
dustry. 2 When it became apparent that no resolution to the contro-
versy was in sight, the employees' union, the United Steelworkers of
America, announced its intention to conduct a general strike.93 The
strike threatened to cripple the national defense industry, which re-
lied heavily on steel to produce munitions, vehicles and weapons for
the military effort in Korea. 94 In an attempt to avert potential catas-
trophe, President Truman issued Executive Order 10,340 on the
night before the strike was to begin.95 The Order authorized the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession of steel mills and operate
them as in the normal course of business.96 The Secretary immedi-
(1952). See infra notes 91-107 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Youngstown.
89. See, e.g., NATIONAL EMERGENCY, supra note 60, at 143-206 (reprinting ex-
amples of executive orders promulgated in times of emergency, war or domestic
disorder).
90. ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS, supra note 59, at 40. The 1957 study ex-
amined a representative sample of executive orders from 1945 to 1956, during which
time Presidents Truman and Eisenhower issued 1,013 orders. Of those, 164, or
16.2%, cited no statutory authority. They did, however, cite authority as President
or commander in chief or from the Constitution and "laws," which places them in
the general category of "inherent" executive power. Id.
91. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
92. Id at 582.
93. Id. The government defused the situation at first, in December 1951, when
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service intervened in response to initial
threats of a strike. Id There was no settlement, though, and the union renewed its
call for a strike, to begin at one minute after midnight on April 9, 1952. Id. at 583.
94. 1&
95. 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952).
96. Id
This occupation was to continue until, in the judgment of the Secretary...
further possession and operation by him of any [steel mill] is no longer neces-
sary or expedient in the interest of national defense, and [he] has reason to
believe that effective future operation is assured, he shall [then] return the pos-
session and operation of such [mill to its owner or operator].
Id. at 3141.
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ately complied with the order, and the President subsequently re-
ported this compliance and the progress of the seizures to
Congress. 97 Meanwhile, the steel companies brought an action in
federal district court against the Secretary, seeking injunctive relief
from the seizures and invalidation of the President's order.98 Three
weeks after President Truman's initial order, the district court judge
issued a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the
seizures. 9 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit stayed the injunction the same day."°° The Supreme Court
granted certiorari three days later, and the arguments began just
nine days thereafter.101
Justice Black wrote the majority opinion, which upheld the in-
junction and the invalidation of the executive order."02 Justice Jack-
son's concurring opinion, however, brought the case its enduring
fame. Justice Jackson identified three categories of presidential
power and their effectiveness compared to congressional power.'013
The President enjoys his greatest degree of power when he has au-
thorization from Congress.'" The middle level of authority exists
97. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952). See 98
CONG. REc. 3842 (1952) (President's report to Congress).
98. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583-84.
99. 103 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1952).
100. Sawyer v. United States Steel Co., 197 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
101. 343 U.S. at 584. Just 34 days separated the start of oral arguments at the
Supreme Court from Truman's executive order itself. The arguments lasted two
days, and the Court announced its decision less than three weeks later. Id.
102. Id. at 589.
103. The categories are "oversimplified," Justice Jackson conceded. Youngs-
town, 343 U.S. at 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). In fact, they may represent
points on a continuum, because "[plresidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." Id. See
also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (characterizing the three
categories as "pigeonholes;" a better metaphor is a "spectrum").
104. "When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization
of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in
his own right plus all that Congress can delegate." Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson continued by suggesting that the
President might be able to exercise putative legislative power "delegated" to him by
Congress, at least where that power implicates one of his constitutional duties, such
as the conduct of foreign affairs. Id. at 635 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)). Of course, leg-
islative power is not "delegable" in the strict sense of the word, so Justice Jackson's
suggestion perhaps would be best put in terms of congressional codification of pre-
existing executive power. See generally Steven J. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
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when the President lacks congressional approval, forcing him to act
with his executive powers alone.10 5 Finally, the President has least
authority when his actions directly contradict congressional in-
tent.106 These categories represent the foundation for modem un-
derstanding of executive power. 0 7 Subsequent cases have built
upon that foundation and have modified it to fit various fact
patterns.
President Carter's unilateral action to suspend private American
claims on Iranian assets in exchange for the release of American
hostages was a first-category, maximum-power action, according to
the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan. 0 s Within the first
category, though, the action fit into the "implied authorization" sub-
set109 insofar as it suspended domestic legal claims. The President
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1155,
1179 n.127 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 424-25 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
105. "When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or de-
nial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., con-
curring). Justice Jackson referred to President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus as an example of this second category of presidential power. Id. at
637 n.3 (Jackson, J., concurring). See supra notes 70-87 and accompanying text for
further discussion of Lincoln's broad assumption of executive authority.
106. "When the President takes measures incompatible with the express or im-
plied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson's
examples here address the power of the President to discharge governmental em-
ployees. See id. at 638 n.4 (citing Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
107. Important as it is to the current understanding of the scope of executive
power, Justice Jackson's opinion is "only" a concurring opinion, as one top Clinton
administration official pointed out to a rather nonplussed law student in a televised
moot court competition. Stuart M. Gerson, Acting U.S. Attorney General, in Na-
tional Security Law Moot Court Competition (C-SPAN television broadcast, Feb. 28,
1993).
108. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
109. Though the statute in question, International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988), gives the President broad authority to contend with
national emergencies emanating from outside the United States, it does not ex-
pressly permit the President to suspend any domestic legal claims. Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,676 (1981). In conjunction with the so-called "Hostage Act,"
22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1988), however, the Dames & Moore Court concluded that Con-
gress "implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement."
453 U.S. at 680. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, accomplished this bit of
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also nullified attachments of Iranian property in the United States
and transferred Iranian assets to the Federal Reserve Bank in prep-
aration for transfer to Iran."' The Court found express authoriza-
tion for these latter actions, thus obviating the need for legal
justification such as the Court contrived for the claims suspension
issue.11
While Dames & Moore had a statutory footing, it also implicated
Article II executive powers.112 Questions concerning the scope of
these executive powers have arisen in other contexts. The Supreme
Court noted in Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McEl-
roy " 3 that the President has authority to control access to a military
base." 4 However, the Court expressly limited that power, explain-
ing that the President necessarily shares it with Congress." 5 The
President also possesses broad authority in the field of national se-
curity, as the Court held in Department of the Navy v. Egan.1 6 Re-
legal legerdemain by asserting that the failure of Congress to address this specific
situation "does not, 'especially ... in the areas of foreign policy and national secur-
ity,' imply 'congressional disapproval' of action taken by the Executive." Id. at 678
(quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981)) (alteration in original). By using
this double negative, Justice Rehnquist decided that "the general tenor of Congress'
legislation in this area" and "a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of
the sort engaged in by the President" lead necessarily to his result, upholding the
suspension of domestic legal claims against Iran. Id. at 678-80.
110. Id. at 665-66.
111. Id. at 674. "A contrary ruling would mean that the Federal Government as
a whole lacked the power exercised by the President.... and that we are not pre-
pared to say." Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Thbe Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
636-37 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
112. The subtext underlying much of Justice Rehnquist's opinion was the Presi-
dent's broad power to conduct foreign affairs. "The constitutional power of the
President extends to the settlement of mutual claims between a foreign government
and the United States, at least when it is an incident to the recognition of that gov-
ernment. . . ." 453 U.S. at 683 (quoting Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231
(2d Cir. 1951) (Hand, J.)).
For other cases upholding the President's exclusive role in the conduct of interna-
tional relations, see Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103 (1948); Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Government and State of Iran, 513 F. Supp.
864 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
113. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
114. Id. at 890. This power is derived from the President's role as commander in
chief of the armed forces. Id.
115. The Court found that "[t]he control of access to a military base is clearly
within the constitutional powers granted to both Congress and the President." Id.
See supra note 20 (listing Congress' powers granted by Article I).
116. 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
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sponding to a challenge from a government employee whose
security clearance was denied,117 the Court concluded that the Presi-
dent's authority as commander in chief includes the ultimate respon-
sibility for national security."" Stressing the importance of that
responsibility, the Egan Court emphasized the unique nature of re-
sponsibility for national security as a power exclusively vested in the
President.1 9
A third context of presidential authority appears in American Sat-
ellite Co. v. United States. 20 In American Satellite, the court re-
jected a challenge to the President's authority to forbid commercial
payloads on space flights. 12' The court reasoned that the President
had established the very policy that the plaintiff now contended he
could not change, and that Congress acquiesced in the President's
action.123
117. Egan, a laborer at a naval submarine facility, could not continue his em-
ployment there because of the denial of security clearance. Id. at 521. The denial
largely stemmed from Egan's prior felony convictions, although the Navy indicated
that his self-admitted "drinking problems" were also a factor in the decision. Id.
118. Id. at 527.
119. The Court noted that, "[The President's] authority [in national security mat-
ters] exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant." Id. (citing Cafeteria
and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 890 (1961)).
120. 26 Cl. Ct. 146 (1992).
121. Id. at 148. The plaintiff, American Satellite, contracted with the govern-
ment to have two of its satellites launched aboard the space shuttle. The second
launch, scheduled for early 1987, was scrubbed when President Reagan issued an
order precluding further commercial satellite traffic on shuttle missions in the after-
math of the space shuttle Challenger tragedy. Id.
122. The court found an "inherent contradiction" in American Satellite's allega-
tion. Id. at 153. "On the one hand, [the plaintiff] places its complete reliance on the
1982 policy statement [issued by the President permitting commercial payloads on
the shuttle].... When the President in effect revisited that policy in 1986, however,
[the plaintiff] contends the change was illegal." Id. at 153-54 (footnote omitted).
123. Id. at 154. Using precedent to support the idea that congressional inaction
may render an otherwise questionable executive action proper, the Supreme Court
noted that "a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowl-
edge of the Congress and never before questioned ... may be treated as a gloss on
'executive Power' vested [constitutionally] in the President by § 1 of Art. II."
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring), quoted in American Satellite, 26 Cl. Ct. at 154. "Past practice does
not, by itself, create power, but 'long-continued practice known to and acquiesced in
by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursu-
ance of its consent . . . ."' Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981)
(quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)), quoted in
American Satellite, 26 Cl. Ct. at 154 (alteration in original).
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Courts, however, do recognize limits on executive power, even in
the pursuit of compelling governmental interests. An executive or-
der lacking congressional assent has potential problems: it may be
difficult both to enforce it and to ascertain its validity.124 Some
courts have held that, notwithstanding their inclusion in Justice
Jackson's second category of presidential power,125 only the execu-
tive department may enforce orders promulgated without congres-
sional assent,126 and that congressional action easily overcomes such
orders.127
These cases, however, do not dispose of the issue whether a presi-
dential order regulating the military will have any legal effect, in
light of Congress' constitutional mandate to regulate the armed
forces. 128 The precedent splits neatly into two strands, one support-
ing the right of the President to act unilaterally and the other assert-
ing that Congress retains control of day-to-day military
operations. 129 At present, that split is nowhere more evident than in
the controversy over the ban on homosexuals in the military.
124. See supra note 105 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Jack-
son's second category of presidential power.
125. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also supra note
105 and accompanying text discussing the scope of Jackson's second category.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1387-88 (C.D. Cal.
1982) (noting that "[a]bsent the requisite legislative foundation, the executive order
is without the force and effect of law"); United States v. Martin, 557 F. Supp. 681,
688-89 (N.D. Iowa 1982) (stating that the court cannot enforce an executive order
lacking statutory authority).
127. One court stated rather broadly, "Of course, an executive order cannot su-
persede a statute." Marks v. CIA, 590 F.2d 997, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The Marks
court, however, did not cite any authority for its assertion, nor did it address the
situation where the President's power constitutionally supersedes that of Congress,
as in certain aspects of the military and foreign affairs. See supra notes 20-29, 59-70
and accompanying text for a general overview of the clash between executive and
legislative power.
128. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cI. 14.
129. Compare United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291 (1842) ("The power
of the executive to establish rules and regulations for the government of the [armed
forces] is undoubted .... ) with United States v. Symonds, 120 U.S. 46 (1887) ("The
authority of the [executive department] to issue ... regulations [regarding the armed
forces] is subject to the condition ... that they must be consistent with the statutes
which have been enacted by Congress in reference to the [military]."). Cf. Tarble's
Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 408 (1871).
Among the powers assigned to the National government, is the power "to raise
and support armies," and the power "to provide for the government of the land
and naval forces." The execution of these powers falls within the line of its
duties; and its control over the subject is plenary and exclusive.
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III. THE BAN ON HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY
There is a long history of legal and administrative barriers
preventing or hindering homosexuals from serving in the military.
The earliest American military law proscribing homosexual acts ap-
peared in 1917."'1 The statute forbade only assault with intent to
commit sodomy. 13 1 Four years later, a legislative revision made sod-
omy itself a separate offense.132 The law in effect today is essen-
tially the same as that which became part of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1951.133 Article 125 of the UCMJ pro-
hibits all forms of sodomy, with or without consent, and provides for
punishment by court-martial.' 34
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8) (emphasis added). Note that the Court in Tar-
ble did not define the term "National government," but the two examples of power
to which it cites are explicitly granted to Congress. Id.
130. Jeffrey S. Davis, Military Policy Toward Homosexuals: Scientific, Historical
and Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L. REv. 55, 72 & n.116 (1991) (citing Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States, para. 443 (1917)).
The military's aversion to homosexuals is not a twentieth-century phenomenon.
Randy Shilts identifies Lieutenant Gotthold Frederick Enslin as the first person to
be discharged from the United States military for being homosexual. Lt. Enslin was
convicted by a court-martial on March 10, 1778, and literally "drummed out" of the
Continental Army five days later. SHiLTs, supra note 9, at 11-12. In fact, the man
historians credit as second only to George Washington in the importance of his mili-
tary contributions to the American Revolution, Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steu-
ben, was a renowned homosexual. Id. at 7-11. See also JOSEPH R. RILING, BARON
VON STEUBEN AND His REGULATIONS 1-19 (describing von Steuben's role in instil-
ling military discipline to the ragtag Continental Army, and including a description
of the Baron's "strong[ ] attract[ion]" to his seventeen-year-old interpreter and mili-
tary secretary).
131. Davis, supra note 130, at 72-73. Originally, the definition of sodomy in-
cluded only anal intercourse. Id. at 73.
132. Id. The new regulation added oral sodomy to the category of illegal
activity.
133. Id.
134. Article 125 of the UCMJ states:
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copu-
lation with another person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is
guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the
offense.
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a court-martial
may direct.
Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1988). Despite the pro-
vision prescribing courts-martial for violators of this section, those who participate
in consensual sodomy generally undergo administrative separation from service.
Davis, supra note 130, at 74. One commentator has noted that, although the regula-
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Even before the enactment of Article 125, a regulation titled "In-
aptness or Undesirable Habits or Traits of Character" governed mil-
itary procedure concerning homosexuals.' 35 By the end of World
War II, only those who actively committed homosexual acts were
subject to the regulation.' 36 That was the high-water mark for toler-
ance of homosexuals in the military. By 1958, all requirements for
discharge based only on specific acts of homosexuality disappeared,
and, by 1977, discretion to retain homosexuals disappeared as
well.
137
A. Department of Defense Directive 1332.14
The federal regulation banning homosexuals from the military
first appeared in 1981,138 and it retains most of its operative effect
despite the Clinton administration's modifications.' 3 9 It explicitly
separates persons who are homosexual regardless of any affirmative
tion is facially neutral, a disproportionate number of those separated under Article
125 are homosexual. SmLrs, supra note 9, at 243-44.
135. See Comment, Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FoRDHAm L. Rv. 465,465
(1969). Under this regulation, the person received an honorable, or "White," dis-
charge unless he demonstrated one of several characteristics, including "sexual per-
version including homosexuality .... " In that case, the person received a "Blue"
discharge (without honor). Id. at 465-66.
136. Id. at 466-67.
137. Davis, supra note 130, at 76-77. See generally id. at 72-79 (summarizing the
history of military laws and regulations prohibiting homosexuality).
138. Department of Defense Directive 1332.14, 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A, pt. 1,
para. H (1992) (effective Jan. 16, 1981). The introductory paragraph of the directive
reveals its purpose and rationale:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the mili-
tary environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by
their statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct,
seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military mission. The presence of
such members adversely affects the ability of the Military Services to maintain
discipline, good order, and morale; to foster mutual trust and confidence among
servicemembers; to ensure the integrity of the system of rank and command; to
facilitate the assignment and worldwide deployment of servicemembers who
frequently must live and work under close conditions affording minimal privacy;
to recruit and retain members of the Military Services; to maintain the public
acceptability of military service; and to prevent breaches of security.
Id. at para. H.l.a. (original version at 46 Fed. Reg. 9577 (1981); subsequent version
at 46 Fed. Reg. 31,667 (1981)).
139. The revised policy changes the means of enforcement and lessens the fervor
with which it is to be enforced. The substantive provisions, mandating separation of
known homosexuals and forbidding homosexual conduct, remain in effect. See Clin-
ton is said to Accept Parts of Plan on Gay Ban, N.Y. TIMFs, July 16, 1993, at A10
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acts they may have committed. 40 The regulation modified an ear-
lier version that declared homosexuals unsuitable for service.141 In
its current form, the regulation makes separation mandatory 42 if a
member of the armed forces commits a homosexual act14 3 or at-
tempts to do so;144 if the member admits that he or she is homosex-
ual or bisexual; 45 or if the member marries or attempts to marry
(describing White House attempts to reduce the severity of the ban without aban-
doning it completely).
140. The directive excludes homosexuals from the military based solely on their
status as homosexuals. Its definition of "homosexual" encompasses all "person[s],
regardless of sex, who engage[] in, desire[] to engage in, or intend[] to engage in
homosexual acts .... ." 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A, pt. 1, para. H.1.b.(1) (1992) (empha-
sis added). Generally, the constitutionality of a provision that treats persons differ-
ently based on mere status is questionable. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 666-67 (1962) (invalidating a state statute that criminalized the status of
"be[ing] addicted to the use of narcotics").
141. See 41 Fed. Reg. 9090 (1976) (listing "Homosexual or Other Aberrant Sex-
ual Tendencies" as grounds for separation under the category of "Unsuitability").
142. "A member shall be separated... if one of [several] findings is made ......
32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A, pt. 1, para. H.1.c. (1992).
Despite the compulsory nature of the regulation, one commentator has noted that
the directive has been overlooked conveniently during wartime, when the need for
personnel is greatest. GAYS IN UNIFORM: THE PENTAGON'S SECRET REPORTS at xiii
(Kate Dyer ed., 1990). Once the fighting ended, the separations resumed in earnest.
Id. The number of discharges for homosexuality during the Vietnam years illus-
trates this extraregulatory discretion. Such discharges decreased an average of 28%
each year for four years, from 1,708 in 1966 to just 461 in 1970. SHILTS, supra note 9,
at 70. This "flexible enforcement" of the regulation has occurred in every major
military engagement from World War II to Desert Storm. Id. at 71.
143. "A homosexual act means bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively
permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual
desires." 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A, pt. 1, para. H.l.b.(3).
144. Id. at para. H.1.c.(1). Exceptions to mandatory separation include, inter
alia, situations when the conduct "is a departure from the member's usual and cus-
tomary behavior," when it "is unlikely to recur" or when "[t]he member does not
desire to engage in or intend to engage in homosexual acts." Id. An administrative
board determines whether the member satisfies these conditions in any given case.
See generally 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A, pt. 3.
145. 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A, pt. 1, para. H.1.c.(2). The exception here is when
"there is a further finding that the member is not a homosexual or bisexual." Id.
This exception exists to prevent intentional attempts to avoid military service, I la
Corporal Klinger in the CBS television series "M*A*S*H." Many young American
men did in fact become "gay deceivers" in an effort to escape serving in Vietnam.
Several organizations and publications explicitly advocated being a "hoaxosexual"
as an excellent method to dodge the draft. SHmLTS, supra note 9, at 67-68.
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someone of the same sex.'4 6 The discharge, if solely on the basis of
homosexuality, must be honorable, unless one of several aggravat-
ing circumstances exists.' 47 The remainder of the regulation
prescribes procedures for instituting and conducting separationproceedings.148
B. Discharge for Homosexual Conduct (Sodomy)
Much, if not all, of the debate over the regulation centers on the
second of the three separation criteria, confession of homosexuality.
Cases holding that a state may constitutionally prohibit sodomy sup-
port the constitutionality of the first criterion of the regulation, af-
firmative homosexual acts as grounds for separation.149  The
146. 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A, pt. 1, para. H.l.c.(3). Whether someone is "of the
same sex" as the member is "evidenced by the external anatomy of the persons
involved .... " Id. This provision also contains a "Klinger exception" for "gay
deceivers." See supra note 145.
147. Generally, the circumstances that would lead to less-than-honorable dis-
charge entail homosexual activity that is criminal, public or in violation of the supe-
rior-subordinate relationship. 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A, pt. 1, para. H.2.
148. Id. at para. H.3.
149. Currently, no less than 22 states have statutes that make sodomy between
consenting adults a crime to one degree or another. The statutes generally use one
or more of three terms to identify the illegal act: "sodomy;" "deviate sexual inter-
course" or "conduct;" or "crime against nature." Several states that use the latter
term embellish it with one or two descriptive adjectives. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-63
(1982) (sodomy); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (1989) ("infamous" crime
against nature); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1987) (sodomy; unlawful for
homosexuals only); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1992) (sodomy); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-6605 (1987) ("infamous" crime against nature); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-
3505 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (sodomy; unlawful for homosexuals only); LA. REv.
STAT. Ar. § 14:89 (West 1986) (crime against nature); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 554 (1957) (sodomy; unlawful for homosexuals only); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293
(West 1987) (sodomy); Miss. CODE At. § 97-29-59 (1972) ("detestable and abomi-
nable" crime against nature); Motr. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1991) (deviate sexual
conduct; unlawful for homosexuals only); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-12-57 (Michie 1989)
(sodomy; applies only to military personnel); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1986)
(crime against nature); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983) ("detestable and
abominable" crime against nature); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1981) ("abominable
and detestable" crime against nature); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1990) (sod-
omy). Six states describe the crime in unique terms. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02
(West 1976) (unnatural and lascivious act); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979)
(sexual misconduct; unlawful for homosexuals only); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120
(Law. Co-op. 1985) (buggery); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1988) (to "car-
nally know" any person or animal). Two states explicitly prohibit homosexual acts
or conduct. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1991) ("acts;" unlawful for homo-
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landmark case in this area is Bowers v. Hardwick. °50 The Supreme
Court in Hardwick rejected the argument that due process should
invalidate Georgia's anti-sodomy statute.15' Specifically, the Court
held that no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy
existed, nor was it protected by a right to privacy, thus, the state
could prohibit it.' 52
The Ninth Circuit applied similar reasoning six years earlier in
Belier v. Middendorf."3 In Belier, the Navy discharged the plain-
sexuals only); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1989) ("conduct" and deviate
sexual intercourse).
The District of Columbia, Nevada and Michigan repealed their laws against sod-
omy in 1993. See Rene Sanchez, D.C. Sodomy Law Is Off the Books, WASH. POST,
Sept. 18, 1993, at B3; Bill That Permits Gay Sex Becomes Law in Nevada, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, June 18, 1993, at A12; Gay Relations in Minnesota: Protected But Illegal,
MniNEAPOLIS STAR-TRm., Apr. 5, 1993, at 3B (listing, inter alia, 1993 legalization of
sodomy in Michigan). The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled the anti-sodomy law in
that state unconstitutional in 1992. See Thomas Tolliver, High Court Won't Review
Its Ruling on Sodomy, LExINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Jan. 23, 1993, at C2.
Several other state anti-sodomy laws withstood challenges in 1993. See, e.g., Dan
Bennett, Man Fights 187-Year-Old Oral Sex Law, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Jan. 9, 1993, at Bi (Louisiana); Joan I. Duffy, Everett Asks Repeal of Ark. Sodomy
Law, Says Son is Gay, TiE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Mar. 18, 1993,
at A7 (Arkansas); Elizabeth Kastor, The Battle for the Boy in the Middle: Little
Tyler's Mom Is a Lesbian, So Grandma Got to Take Him Away, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
1993, at C1 (Virginia); Gardner Selby & Mary Lenz, It's a Done Deal for Lawmakers
in Austin: Session Closes Amid Protest, One Last Pitch, Hous. PoST, June 1, 1993, at
All (Texas); Greg Trevor, House Won't Consider Decriminalizing Sodomy, CHAR.
LOTrE OBSERVER, Apr. 23, 1993, at 1C (North Carolina).
150. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
151. Id. at 196.
152. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Hardwick's argument
that he had a fundamental right to engage in sodomy. 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir.
1985). Hardwick also successfully argued in the court of appeals that his activity was
a "private and intimate association that [was] beyond the reach of state regulation
.. " 478 U.S. at 189.
The Supreme Court reversed on both grounds. It held that sodomy was not
among "those fundamental liberties that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty,"' id. at 190-91 (quoting Pako v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)), nor
was it a liberty interest "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition," id. at
192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)), that re-
quired Fourteenth Amendment due process protection. In addition, the Court
noted that many states have statutes forbidding sodomy, and concluded that this
long legacy of statutory proscription was further evidence that there was no "his-
tory" or "tradition" of permitting sodomy. Id. at 192-94. See supra note 149 for a
list of states that prohibit sodomy.
153. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Belier v. Lehman, 452
U.S. 905 (1981), and cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. Weinberger, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
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tiffs after each admitted to taking part in homosexual acts.' 54 They
brought suit against the Navy, alleging violations of their rights
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment and implicitly seeking a ruling that the ban on
homosexuals' 55 was unconstitutional.' 56 The court rejected their
claims and affirmed the discharges. 57
Addressing the plaintiffs' due process claims, the Belier court first
disposed of the procedural due process prong by refusing to find any
deprivation of a property or liberty interest.' 58 On the issue of sub-
stantive due process, the court avoided the question of whether ho-
mosexual activity is a fundamental right 59 and chose instead to
meld the substantive claim with elements of equal protection doc-
trine. 1" The court found the two doctrines much the same: the
more basic the right asserted, the more important the government's
interest must be, and the closer the nexus must be between the ac-
154. 632 F.2d at 792-95.
155. The Secretary of the Navy promulgated the regulation at issue in Belier.
The regulation only applied to the Navy. SECNAVINST 1900.9C, quoted in Belier,
632 F.2d at 802 n.9. The Navy regulation is roughly analogous to Department of
Defense Directive 1332.14, which did not become official until after Beller was de-
cided. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of Directive
1332.14.
156. The plaintiffs also sought injunctions preventing their discharges, along with
various individual claims. 632 F.2d at 793-95.
157. Id. at 812.
158. This is the "threshold inquiry" in procedural due process cases. Belier v.
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 805 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972)). The court found that any purported property interest in continued
employment in the Navy was extinguished when the plaintiffs admitted their homo-
sexual acts. Belier, 632 F.2d at 805 (citing Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76, 81
(D.D.C. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
The court had a more difficult time deciding whether the plaintiffs' claims impli-
cated a protected liberty interest. The court conceded that had the allegations of the
plaintiffs' homosexual acts been false, there would certainly have been a deprivation
of liberty, for the false charges could result in a "stigma" that could limit the plain-
tiffs' ability to find other employment. Id. at 806. False allegations were not a prob-
lem for the court, though, because the plaintiffs admitted their actions. Id.
Moreover, "[t]he mere fact of discharge from a government position does not de-
prive a person of a liberty interest." 1d.
159. The Supreme Court later took up this issue in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986). For more on Hardwick, see supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
160. 632 F.2d at 807-12.
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tion and the government's interest.161 Applying that analysis, the
court used the lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis review,162 to
conclude that discharge from the military of those who commit ho-
mosexual acts is rationally related to the legitimate governmental
interest in national security and military order.1 63
161. Id. at 807-08 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
162. The court implied that the regulation could withstand at least intermediate-
level scrutiny, in which the regulation must be substantially related to an important
governmental interest. "[T]he importance of the governmental interests furthered
[by the regulation] ... outweigh[s] whatever heightened solicitude is appropriate for
consensual private homosexual conduct." 632 F.2d at 810.
163. Proponents of the ban on homosexuals often advance the national security
interest to bolster their position. The Belier court quoted the affidavit of the Assis-
tant Chief of Naval Personnel describing the rationale for the ban.
[I]t is perceived that homosexuality adversely impacts on the effective and effi-
cient performance of the mission of the United States Navy in several
particulars.
(a) Tensions and hostilities would certainly exist between known homosexu-
als and the great majority of naval personnel who despise/detest homosexuality,
especially in the unique close living conditions aboard ships.
(b) An individual's performance of duties could be unduly influenced by
emotional relationships with other homosexuals.
(c) Traditional chain of command problems could be created, i.e., a proper
command relationship could be subverted by an emotional relationship; an of-
ficer or senior enlisted person who exhibits homosexual tendencies will be un-
able to maintain the necessary respect and trust from the great majority of naval
personnel who despise/detest homosexuality, and this would certainly degrade
the individual's ability to successfully perform his duties of supervision and
command.
(d) There would be an adverse impact on recruiting should parents become
concerned with their children associating with individuals who are incapable of
maintaining high moral standards.
(e) A homosexual might force his desires upon others or attempt to do so.
This would certainly be disruptive.
(f) Homosexuals may be less productive/effective than their heterosexual
counterparts because of:
(1) Fear of criminal prosecution;
(2) Fear of social stigmatization;
(3) Fear of loss of spouse and/or family through divorce proceedings as a
result of disclosure;
(4) Undue influence by a homosexual partner.
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d at 811 n.22; see also Judith Hicks Stiehm, Managing
the Military's Homosexual Exclusion Policy: Text and Subtext, 46 U. MIAMI L. Rv.
685, 691-95 (1992) (cataloguing some of the justifications given by the military for
excluding homosexuals). These and other justifications bear a striking resemblance
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Four years after Beller, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reached an identical conclusion on nearly identical
facts in Dronenburg v. Zech.1 4 After refuting certain procedural
claims, Judge Bork, writing for the majority, addressed the appel-
lant's privacy and equal protection arguments.' 65 He summarily
rejected the assertion that Griswold v. Connecticut166 and its prog-
eny' 67 created a constitutional right to privacy in all areas of per-
sonal bodily conduct." After finding no constitutional right to
participate in homosexual activity, the court upheld the regulation
because it rationally advanced the legitimate government interest in
maintaining morale and discipline within the armed forces. 169
C. Discharge for Homosexual "Status"
As important as the decisions in Beller and Dronenburg were,
they left open the critical question whether the military may force
homosexuals out of the service merely for being homosexual. 7 °
to the rationale of those who sought to exclude African-Americans from the military
in the 1940s. See Kenneth A. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation
of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499,510-22 (1991) (discussing the complica-
tions of racial integration in the military); see also SHILTS, supra note 9, at 187-90
(same).
164. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Like the plaintiffs in Beller, Dronenburg
was discharged from the Navy after admitting repeated participation in homosexual
activity on a Navy base. Id. at 1389.
165. Id. at 1391.
166. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that there is a right to privacy derived from
constitutional rights taken as a whole).
167. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391 (citing Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
168. Id. Judge Bork concluded that Griswold's acknowledgement of zones of
privacy did not guarantee that any and every given personal "right" would rest
within the "penumbra." Id. at 1392. In short, the right to privacy, according to the
Dronenburg court, is not absolute. Ld. at 1394-95.
169. Id. Not only was the interest legitimate, it was "a crucial.., interest com-
mon to all our armed forces." Id. (emphasis added). Judge Bork characterized the
inquiry as whether the regulation was "rationally related to a permissible end."
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1398 (emphasis added). See also supra text accom-
panying note 151 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis of Hardwick.
170. As noted above, the plaintiffs in both cases were discharged for committing
homosexual acts while in the armed forces. See supra notes 158 & 164 and accom-
panying text; see also supra note 140 questioning whether a regulation that punishes
on the basis of status is constitutional.
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The court in Rich v. Secretary of the Army 171 explicitly addressed
that issue. As in Belier and Dronenburg, the plaintiff in Rich chal-
lenged his discharge from the armed forces, but this case differed
because there was no admission nor evidence that Rich committed
any homosexual acts while in the service. 72 The primary basis for
his discharge was his statement to a superior that he was homosex-
ual.'7 3 Rich disputed his discharge on substantive' 74 and proce-
dural'75 due process and equal protection 176 grounds, but the court
sided with the Army in upholding the ban.177
Due process and equal protection have been the predominant
grounds for challenging the ban since Rich. During the last five
years, several courts have considered the application of one or both
of these to the ban on homosexuals in the military. Perhaps the
most significant of these is Watkins v. United States Army. 78
171. 516 F. Supp. 621 (D. Colo. 1981), affd, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
172. Rich did not discover his homosexual predilections until after the deaths of
his wife and son. Id. at 623.
173. Id A second reason for the discharge was a written denial of homosexual-
ity on a questionnaire he completed before his "realization" that he was homosex-
ual. Id. at 624.
174. Id. at 626-27. Rich was unable to convince the court that he had a liberty
interest in private consensual homosexual activity. Id. The court applied the rea-
soning of the Ninth Circuit in Belier, determining that the "special circumstances"
surrounding service in the military outweighed any interest Rich may have had in
engaging in private homosexual activity. Id. at 627.
175. Rich claimed that his admitted homosexual acts were "isolated episodes
stemming from immaturity or curiosity ... ." Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 516 F.
Supp. at 627. He argued that Army Regulation 635-200 required officers to exclude
"isolated episodes" of homosexual behavior in making their exclusion determina-
tions, which the commanding officer in charge of the proceeding allegedly failed to
do. Id. at 627-28. The court deferred to the officer's inference "as the trier-of-fact in
this case" that as an admitted homosexual, Rich had committed homosexual acts,
notwithstanding the lack of actual proof of those acts. Id. at 628.
176. Rich argued that his exclusion for being homosexual violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution. The court concluded, however, that homo-
sexuality was not really a "status" like gender, but a form of conduct. Id. Therefore,
the Army could proscribe homosexual conduct with a regulation rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest. Id. The court held that the exclusion of
homosexuals was rationally related to "legitimate governmental interests in disci-
pline and morale." Id
177. Id. at 629.
178. 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
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Watkins had completed a long, strange trip through the courts1 79
when the Ninth Circuit issued a panel decision prohibiting enforce-
ment of an Army anti-homosexuality regulation.' The majority
decided the case on equitable estoppel grounds."' 1 In his concur-
rence, Judge Norris believed that the judgment properly rested on
the suspect classification strand of equal protection." The judge
employed a three-part test to determine whether the Army denied
Watkins equal protection.'83 First, Judge Norris concluded that the
regulation did discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.'84
Second, he determined that strict scrutiny was appropriate because
179. The litigation itself began in 1982, but the Army first investigated Watkins'
homosexuality ten years earlier. Id. at 702. Along the way, the case generated five
separate decisions. See id. at 701 n.1 (citing prior decisions).
From the day of his enlistment, Watkins never hid his homosexuality from military
or government officials. Watkins even performed a popular female impersonation
show at numerous military installations, and an article about his show appeared in
the Army 7mes. MARY ANN Hu Hn'rnEY, My COUNTRY, My Rirr TO SERVE 253-
54 (1990); SHiLTS, supra note 9, at 155-56. In spite of this behavior, Watkins re-
mained in the Army for fourteen years. The Army refused to discharge him "be-
cause he could not really prove he was gay." Id at 64.
180. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 711. The regulation at issue, unlike Directive 1332.14,
excluded homosexuals from reenlistment. Id at 703. See supra notes 138-48 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Directive 1332.14.
181. The majority made three findings in this regard. First, the court was compe-
tent to review internal military affairs. Id. at 705-06 (citing Mindes v. Seaman, 453
F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971)). Second, because Watkins showed that the government
committed "affirmative misconduct" and that serious injustice would accrue from
the Army's refusal to reenlist Watkins, estoppel could lie against the government.
Id. at 707-09 (citing, e.g., Wagner v. Director, FEMA, 847 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1988);
Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1982)). Third, the court found that each
of the four elements of estoppel were present: the Army knew about Watkins' ho-
mosexuality during his entire career, Watkins could reasonably "believe the Army
intended him to rely on its acts," he knew that homosexuality was "a non-waivable
disqualification for reenlistment," and Watkins relied "to his injury" on the Army's
failure to discharge him. Id. at 707-11. "[E]quity cries out and demands that the
Army be estopped from refusing to reenlist Watkins on the basis of his homosexual-
ity." Id. at 711.
182. Id. at 711-31 (Norris, J., concurring).
183. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d at 712 (Norris, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 712-16. The regulation on its face purported to proscribe homosexual
conduct, but it defined homosexual as those who "desire[ ] bodily contact between
persons of the same sex .... Id. at 714. Under that definition, the Army could
refuse reenlistment to persons who never committed a homosexual act, but who had
a homosexual orientation. ld.; see also supra note 140 quoting the analogous lan-
guage in Department of Defense Directive 1332.14.
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homosexuals constitute a suspect class.185 Third, applying a deferen-
tial form of strict scrutiny, 8 6 the judge rejected each of the Army's
asserted interests in maintaining the regulation against
homosexuals. 87
The Seventh Circuit exhibited much greater deference to military
decisionmaking in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh.' In this case, as in Wat-
kins, the Army discharged the plaintiff for mere homosexuality
without conduct.' 89 The court in Ben-Shalom, however, held that
the plaintiff's admission of homosexuality necessarily admitted ho-
185. 875 F.2d at 724-28 (Norris, J., concurring). Judge Norris reached his conclu-
sion by considering each of the factors in suspect class determination. He found that
homosexuals had "suffered a history of purposeful discrimination." Id. at 724 (cit-
ing, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (noting that a
homosexual must have a history of purposeful discrimination to be considered sus-
pect); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1975) (same); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (same)). Discrimination
against homosexuals is "invidious" because sexual orientation is irrelevant to one's
ability to function in society and "classifications based on sexual orientation reflect
prejudice and inaccurate stereotypes.... ." Id. at 724-25. "[S]cientific research indi-
cates that we have little control over our sexual orientation and that, once acquired,
our sexual orientation is largely impervious to change." Id. at 726. Finally, "homo-
sexuals as a group cannot protect their right to be free from invidious discrimination
by appealing to the political branches." Id. at 727. See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S.
635, 638 (1986) (identifying suspect class factors).
For more on suspect class doctrine as it applies to homosexuals, see Renee
Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34 S. TEx. L.
Rnv. 205 (1993); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexual-
ity as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285 (1985); Harris M. Miller 1I, An
Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Protection Scrutiny to
Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 797 (1984); see also
infra note 235 exploring a possible link between genetics and homosexuality, which
would support the concept of homosexuals as a suspect class.
186. Judge Norris recognized that the military deserves some judicial deference
in reviewing internal matters. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 728 (Norris, J., concurring). He
questioned the propriety of deference because Congress only criminalized sodomy
between military personnel, not homosexuality itself. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 925
(1988)).
187. Even with deference to the military, Judge Norris rejected the asserted jus-
tifications for maintaining the ban, drawing an analogy to the rationales for racial
segregation in the armed forces fifty years ago. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 729 (Norris, J.,
concurring). The justifications include avoiding interpersonal discord, preventing
ridicule of the military in general and protecting the military's public image. Id.
Each of these has a clear analogy in the integration struggle. Id.
188. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).
189. Id. at 456.
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mosexual desire as well."9 It distinguished Rich' 91 on the ground
that Rich was ambivalent about his sexuality, whereas Ben-Shalom
freely admitted she was a lesbian. 192 The court disagreed with the
Watkins concurrence, refusing to believe that homosexuality is a
suspect classification. 193 Instead, the regulation need only pass ra-
tional basis scrutiny, under which the Ben-Shalom court found it
satisfactory.'
94
Ben-Shalom alternatively proposed a unique basis for challenging
the ban: the First Amendment. 95 The court disposed of that argu-
ment by again deferring to military judgment. 96 The regulation re-
stricts conduct rather than speech, according to the court, and in
addition, the military has a legitimate interest in restricting certain
speech.197 The court concluded that Ben-Shalom's declarations of
homosexuality may have been "speech" in the First Amendment
sense. 98 Nevertheless, the regulation proscribing those declarations
satisfied the four-prong test of United States v. O'Brien'9 9 for deter-
mining whether government may restrict "speech. ''200
190. Ben-Shalom and Watkins both concerned the same Army regulation, pro-
viding for the discharge of any person who "desires bodily contact between persons
of the same sex." Id. at 464. See supra note 184 and accompanying text for addi-
tional discussion of the regulation.
191. See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rich
opinion.
192. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d at 464.
193. Id. at 465.
194. "The... regulation, we find, clearly promotes a legitimate government in-
terest sufficient to survive rational basis scrutiny . . . '[There] is no doubt that the
[Watkins] majority's intrusion into military affairs, unjustified by important federal
interests, will have a disruptive effect upon military discipline."' Id. (quoting Wat-
kins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 736 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Hall, J.,
dissenting)).
195. Ben-Shalom argued that the First Amendment protected her declarations
of homosexuality. Because the regulation applied to those who express a "desire"
for homosexual activity, she contended, it prevented her from freely stating her sex-
ual orientation. Id. at 459.
196. Id. at 461. Deference to the military is greater in First Amendment matters.
Id. (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
197. Id. at 462. "[Ben-Shalom] is free to advocate that the Army change its
stance; she is free to know and talk to homosexuals if she wishes. What [she] cannot
do, and remain in the Army, is to declare herself to be a homosexual." Id.
198. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 462.
199. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
200. [A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the consti-
tutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
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More recently, the plaintiff in Pruitt v. Cheney20 1 also argued a
violation of the First Amendment when challenging her discharge
from the Army Reserve.2" Conceding that the armed forces may
prohibit homosexual conduct, Pruitt contended that the military
could not discharge her solely on the basis of a newspaper article
identifying her as a homosexual.2"3 Pruitt had no more success with
that argument than did Ben-Shalom; the court affirmed summary
judgment against her.2"4 She gained a minor victory, however, on
her equal protection claim,20 5 despite the fact that the court did not
consider homosexuals a suspect class. 206 Under rational basis re-
view, the proper level of scrutiny for non-suspect classes, the court
declared that Pruitt averred facts sufficient to state an equal protec-
tion violation.20 7 The Department of Defense petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, but the court denied the writ
government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on First Amendment
freedoms is no greater that is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377, quoted in Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 462.
201. 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992).
202. Pruitt, a Methodist minister and a Major in the Army Reserves, was the
subject of a newspaper article in which she revealed that she was a lesbian and that
she had been married to other women on two occasions. Id. at 1161.
203. Id. at 1163. Pruitt asserted that her statements in the article were "pro-
tected expression," and the court agreed with her to some extent. Id.
204. Id. at 1167. The court pointed out that Pruitt based her First Amendment
claim on "the classic dichotomy between the punishment of speech and the punish-
ment of conduct." Id. at 1163. According to the court, the Army regulation in ques-
tion proscribed only homosexual conduct, which it inferred from Pruitt's statement
that she was a homosexual. Id.
205. Id. at 1164-67. After Watkins, equal protection superseded due process as
the constitutional claim of choice for litigants asserting their rights as homosexuals,
For cases relying on equal protection arguments, see High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 570-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v,
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463-66 (7th Cir. 1989); Meinhold v. United States Dep't of
Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455, 1457-58 (C.D. Cal. 1993), appeal denied, No. CV-92-
6044-TJI-, 1993 WL 195368 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 1993) (per curiam); Steffan v. Cheney,
780 F. Supp. 1, 3-10 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C.
Cir. 1993), reh'g granted, 8 F.3d 57, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
For further discussion of Meinhold, see infra note 233.
206. The Pruitt court did not address the suspect class issue, but by applying
rational basis scrutiny, they implied that homosexuals do not comprise a suspect
class. Pruitt, 963 F.2d at 1166-67 (citing High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 576-77; City of
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448, 450 (1985)).
207. Pruitt, 963 F.2d at 1167.
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in December 1992.2  Thus, Pruitt is the latest conclusive word re-
garding the constitutionality of the ban on homosexuals in the mili-
tary, but, as recent events demonstrate, it is not likely to be the last.
IV. PREsIDENT CLINTON SHOULD L=r T=m BAN COMPLETELY
As Bill Clinton took the oath of office on January 20, 1993, he
faced many daunting tasks. On top of the economic troubles, the
turmoil in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia, and the Attorney Gen-
eral debacle, the new President chose to launch an assault on the
regulation barring homosexuals from military service. Analysts and
Washington insiders felt that the President's decision was a public
relations disaster,2° coming as it did in the midst of so much strife.
Most of the public supports the President's desire to lift the ban,210
notwithstanding a vocal minority strong enough to force Clinton to
compromise his campaign pledge.21' Predictably, the spectrum of
opinion runs neatly along conservative/liberal lines, with the military
fairly united in opposition to lifting the ban.212 The military has lit-
tle choice in the matter, for they must obey the President's or-
ders.2 13 Congress cannot overcome the President's order, because
even if Congress has authority to regulate military affairs gener-
ally,214 a statutory ban on homosexuals could not survive equal pro-
208. 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992).
209. See William A. Henry III, Clinton's First Fire Fight, TrME, Nov. 30, 1992, at
42 (commenting on the emotional response to Clinton's proposal).
210. "Polls show a majority of the public favors lifting the ban." Id.
211. The original Clinton administration plan called for an immediate end to
questioning recruits about their sexual orientation and to investigating the sexual
orientation of current members. Accord Near on Gays, ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH,
Jan. 29, 1993, at 1A. The "instruction" also suspended all discharge cases pending
against alleged homosexuals. Id. Defense Secretary Les Aspin originally was to
draft an executive order implementing the new regulations, during which time Con-
gress was to hold hearings on the matter. Barton Gellman, Clinton Sets 2-Phase
Plan to Allow Gays in Military, WASH. PosT, Jan. 22, 1993, at Al. The administra-
tion scaled back the plan significantly, bowing to "realistic political options." Edito-
rial, Don't Ask Don't Tell Don't Budge, ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH, July 18,1993, at
2B.
212. See Worse Than a Crime, NAT'L REvIEw, Dec. 14, 1992, at 18 (opposing
lifting the ban); Contra Ending the Ban, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 7, 1992, at 7 (favoring
lifting the ban).
213. "[Tlhe armed forces stand 'ready to do what we're told."' Henry, supra
note 209, at 42 (quoting Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
214. See supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text discussing the President's role
as commander in chief.
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tection scrutiny. 5 Public opinion opposing the action will have
little effect because the reasons people give in support of the ban
generally reflect stereotypes and fears.
2 1 6
A. Opinion Within the Military
The military is a remarkable breeding ground for stereotypes and
uneducated conclusions about homosexuals, much as it was for Afri-
can-Americans not too long ago.217 Military personnel complain
about homosexuals' promiscuity1 ' and their own uneasiness about
simply being around homosexuals.2 19 Many members of the mili-
tary feel threatened by the presence of homosexuals in close prox-
imity, especially with the added fear of AIDS.22 ° Some of them, in
fact, seem baffled by the idea of homosexual military service.2 2 '
215. See infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text discussing probable failure of
statutory ban.
216. See infra notes 217-21 and accompanying text discussing attitudes of mem-
bers of the armed forces towards homosexuality.
217. For an excellent discussion of the struggle for acceptance by African-Amer-
icans in the armed forces, see Karst, supra note 163, at 499, 510-22. Karst also exam-
ines the exclusion of homosexuals from the military in general and the exclusion of
women from combat. See generally id.
218. An unusually crass comment concerning this stereotype that all homosexu-
als are promiscuous came from a staff sergeant deployed in Somalia. "I don't want
to walk into the Marine Ball and find two guys swapping spit on the dance floor."
Moore, supra note 11, at A10.
219. "As for me, personally, I can work with them as long as they don't give me
no eye contact." Moore, supra note 11, at A10 (quoting soldier).
220. Lancaster, supra note 2, at A8.
221. A striking example of the ignorance of some who favor the ban took place
on CNN's "Crossfire" program in January 1993, when host Mike Kinsley and Lt.
Col. (Ret.) William Gregor discussed the issue of homosexuals in the military.
KINSLEY: [A]s you know in 1948, President Truman desegregated the military,
and there were many objections. The analogy is not perfect, but there is this
similarity.... [T]oday the military is the most successfully racially integrated
part of our society. Now, doesn't that teach a lesson?
GREGOR: No, it doesn't. The semantics of the saying, the situation is different.
I suggest that you look at the studies of the attempts to induct active venereals
during World War II. In those studies, you will read that -
KINSLEY: What's an active venereal? You mean someone who has venereal
disease?
GREGOR: A person who is actually diseased when he came in.
KrNsLEY: Well, no - what does that have to do with homosexuals?
GREGOR: Well, precisely why as a public health concern. If you've donated
blood recently, you'll read this safety article, and it'll say right on [it], if you are
[a] man who have had sex with another man since 1977, even once, do not give
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Although unreasonable, the reaction of the average member of the
service is not without relevance, and the President should be pre-
pared to take it into account.
B. Effectiveness of an Executive Order
An issue critical to the ultimate eradication of the ban is whether
an executive order would suffice to overturn it entirely. The Presi-
dent certainly could not justify the order on national emergency
grounds.222 He could not rely on a specific statutory grant of power
because no statute specifically authorizes the President to establish
blood. Now, what that means in civilian society is we use universal precautions.
We've probably seen a basketball game pause while people change bloody jer-
seys, but what -
KINSLEY: Are you suggesting that someone is going to catch AIDS on the bat-
tlefield? Is that your point?
GREGOR: What will be the effect in the military of attempting to apply univer-
sal standards? Will we stop every boxing match -
KINSLEY: Colonel, once again I don't understand your point.
GREGOR: - at West Point and sanitize the ring?
KINSLEY: Do you have any evidence that anyone has ever or could ever catch
AIDS because of blood in a battlefield? Because the experts say that's
impossible.
GREGOR: Well, wait a second, sir. Let's imagine for a second, you've gone
through training [for] years and developed the habit of universal precautions.
Every time somebody gets a nosebleed, you stop the game. Everybody who
gets blood on the floor, you disinfect it. Now you go to the battlefield. Every
tanker knows that on a battlefield, next to fire, the main cause of death is exsan-
guination, you bleed to death.
KINSLEY: What does that have to do -
GREGOR: The question is, if a penetrator courses through a turret and ampu-
tates a gunner's arm, will the tank commander, having developed this habit of
universal precautions, instantaneously and swiftly grab that bloody stump [sic]
to save the life of his friend? Or will he hesitate and allow the life of his buddy
to slip away?
KINSLEY: Well, wouldn't you say that if someone gay wants to join the military
and is willing to take the risk of that rather absurd scenario you just painted,
[and] that his commander would be unwilling to grab his bloody stump, then he
should be allowed to join the military? What are you worried about?
GREGOR: No, that's not the point. You are failing to identify the people who
pose a risk.
Crossfire: Homosexuals in the Military (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 25, 1993),
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, CNN file.
222. See generally NATIONAL EMERGENCY, supra note 60, at 139-44 discussing
executive orders in times of emergency.
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qualifications for military service.2 However, the President could
point to several general statutes, interpreting them to suit his
needs.224 He also could cite his exclusive constitutional power as
commander in chief to support his authority in this area.2 5 The
President's order would be effective under any or all of these justifi-
cations, as the experiences of his predecessors attest.2 26
The law is fairly clear that the only device that can overrule an
executive order is another executive order. 7 The ban on homosex-
uals was not originally an executive order, but an executive depart-
ment directive.228 Nonetheless, because the President supervises all
of the executive departments, 229 any directive of one of those
departments is tantamount to a statement from the President him-
self."3 Therefore, President Clinton could legally and constitution-
ally lift the ban in toto by executive order.
223. See supra notes 59-129 and accompanying text surveying the basis for presi-
dential action.
224. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1988) (allowing regulation of subordinates within
executive department); 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1988) (permitting the President to issue reg-
ulations concerning executive department employees); 10 U.S.C. § 121 (1988)
(granting the President broad authority to "issue regulations" respecting the armed
forces). See also supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text discussing statutory au-
thority for presidential action.
225. U.S. CONS'T. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text
evaluating scope of President's role as commander in chief.
226. Over 16 percent of the executive orders issued from 1945 to 1956 asserted
no statutory authority at all, yet only one of 1,013 orders promulgated during that
time was overruled by something other than another executive order. ORDERS AND
PROCLAMATrIONS, supra note 59, at 40. The one exception was President Truman's
order seizing the steel mills, which the Supreme Court invalidated in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For a discussion of Youngstown,
see supra notes 91-107 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 226. Of course, courts may review executive orders and
overturn them if they find that the orders violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); cf. Marks v. CIA, 590 F.2d
997 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that President's executive order cannot supersede a
statute).
228. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text for an overview of the De-
partment of Defense Directive.
229. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
230. "We may take it as settled that Navy Regulations approved by the President
are. . . endowed with 'the sanction of the law."' Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 891 (1961) (quoting Marshall, CJ.). See also supra
note 38.
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C. Inadequacy of Congressional Action
The President shares certain authority over the military with Con-
gress,231 yet the Constitution literally vests Congress with regulatory
power over the armed forces.1 2 What the Constitution gives, how-
ever, the Constitution may take away, for Congress cannot enact a
statute that contradicts a constitutional mandate. A statute to rein-
state the ban would be unconstitutional as a violation of equal pro-
tection.23 The statute would fail either because homosexuals are a
suspect class234 or because a rational basis for excluding homosexu-
als no longer exists by current scientific standards. 35 Congress sim-
ply cannot supersede the President's power as commander in chief
and as chief executive to issue regulations for the conduct of mem-
231. See supra notes 20 & 115 discussing the President's sharing of power with
Congress.
232. "The Congress shall have Power... To make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces ... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 14.
233. Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992);
Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993),
appeal denied, No. CV-92-6044-TJH, 1993 WL 195368 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 1993) (per
curiam).
As the first judicial statement asserting that the ban is unconstitutional, Meinhold
is likely to be one of the first challenges to the ban to reach the United States
Supreme Court. Pentagon to Fight a Gay-Bias Ruling, N.Y. TIES, Oct. 13, 1993, at
A19. On September 30, 1993, one day before President Clinton's "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell, Don't Pursue" policy was to take effect, the federal district judge who wrote the
majority opinion in Meinhold issued an order enjoining enforcement of the ban un-
less the government could show "proven sexual conduct" that would "interfere with
the military mission of the armed forces." Id. (quoting order). A three-judge panel
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the order on October 8, denying the
government's motion to suspend or vacate the order. Id. The Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion forced the Department of Defense to suspend investigations and separations of
homosexuals and delayed implementation of the revised policy. Bettina Boxall, U.S.
Loses Bid to Stay Ruling on Gays in Military, L.A. Trmrs, Oct. 12, 1993, at A3.
234. See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (1989) (en banc) (Norris,
J., concurring) (labeling homosexuals as a suspect class).
235. See Davis, supra note 130, at 55-64 (explaining scientific theories about ho-
mosexuality). Scientific research continues to pursue a link between heredity and
sexual orientation. A 1993 study by geneticists at the National Cancer Institute
found, with more than 99% certainty, a particular section of DNA on the X chromo-
some containing a gene that plays at least some role in determining male sexuality.
Robert Pool, Evidence for Homosexuality Gene, SCIENCE, July 16, 1993, at 291-92;
Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and
Male Sexual Orientation, ScImNCE, July 16, 1993, at 321-27.
1994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
216 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 45:175
bers of the military?3 6 In short, President Clinton currently has sole
and uncontrovertible authority to lift the ban on homosexuals in the
military, if he chooses to do so.3 7 Given his reluctance to do so,
however, it will be left to the courts to judicially end the ban once
and for all.
V. CONCLUSION
The President is the commander in chief of the United States
armed forces and the head of the executive branch. These roles give
him far-reaching authority to issue regulations concerning the oper-
ation of the military and the conduct of its members. The President
can promulgate regulations through the use of executive orders,
and, though they cannot conflict with a valid statute, they carry the
force and effect of law.
The exclusion of homosexuals from military service owes its exist-
ence to unsubstantiated fears and stereotypes irrationally associated
with sexual orientation. While the military undoubtedly may regu-
late and proscribe certain conduct, its ban of homosexuals merely
because of their status as homosexuals violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection under the law. Moreover, military
leaders are demonstrably aware that homosexuals are capable of
serving honorably and with distinction in the United States armed
forces?3 s Homosexuals as a class have long suffered from invidious
and intentional discrimination; the ban is one more example of this
shameful heritage. Because President Clinton failed to take one
small step by executive order, the courts must assume the responsi-
236. See supra notes 44-58,225 and accompanying text discussing scope of presi-
dential authority as commander in chief.
237. Although President Clinton vowed during his campaign to lift the ban en-
tirely, the administration presently must defend the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't
Pursue" policy, which it promulgated as a compromise. The administration thus
finds itself unexpectedly fighting a court order that forbids all discrimination against
homosexuals in the military. Frank Defends Clinton on Military-Gays Issue, WASH.
TI Es, Oct. 14, 1993, at A10. See supra note 233 for further discussion of this court
order.
238. See generally GAYS iN UNFORm, supra note 142 (containing numerous De-
partment of Defense reports and memoranda questioning the continued validity of
the ban against homosexuals in the military).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/6
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bility of allowing homosexuals to take a giant leap toward full ac-
ceptance in the military and in society.
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